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NO EASY CONSTITUTIONAL SOLUTION FOR BIG
GOVERNMENT
William N. Eskridge, Jr.*
I start with the question: Why is the national government so large? Or,
perhaps, why did we have that long security line at this conference the other
night? They might be related questions. There are three possible explana-
tions. One reason might be that problems are big and getting bigger-
problems of international terror, nuclear proliferation, a complex economy,
threats to the environment. If the problems are big and complex, bigger
government is a likely response in the modem era. A second possible rea-
son is that we the people want bigger government, perhaps for the first rea-
son, perhaps for a variety of reasons. Hence, we are willing to accept long
lines, etc., because we want the government to regulate. A third possible
reason, maybe in combination with the other two, is that we have big gov-
ernment because of dysfunction. In other words, we might have big gov-
ernment because of logrolling and compromising in the legislature, because
of special interests, as in the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act' and a number of
other pieces of legislation, trading off with one another so that the overall
size of government gets bigger and bigger as each group is paid off in its
own rent-seeking way. Another dysfunctional reason to consider is turf-
grabbing by federal government agencies. That might be one reason why
we have so many security lines. These are possible reasons for our big
government, and some of them might be all right, but most are lamentable.
Following the Framers of the 1789 Philadelphia Convention, the Fed-
eralist Society has asked us this question: Can we make structural or consti-
tutional changes that will shrink the national government in appropriate
ways, in ways that will not derogate what we the people want or our ability
to address genuine problems, while also addressing issues of special interest
logrolling and turf-protection? Some of the items we have been asked to
address are the line-item veto, term limits, and the national initiative.
Now, at least two of these mechanisms have been tested, and we have
data. I have some thoughts on the third one. I go in surprisingly different
* William N. Eskridge, Jr. is a Professor at Yale Law School. Professor Eskridge originally deliv-
ered these remarks during Showcase Panel III, entitled Are Constitutional Changes Necessary to Limit
Government?, at the Federalist Society's 2006 National Lawyers Convention, on Saturday, November
18, 2006, in Washington, D.C.
I Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590 (1930) (codified as amended
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directions on the three. I am most pessimistic about the line-item veto,
which we have tried briefly at a federal level. It did not produce a lot of
shrinkage in government. At the state level, we have a lot of experience
with line-item vetoes. An overwhelming majority of states have, and have
had, line-item vetoes, which have been studied relentlessly by political sci-
entists using comparative data regression analyses and other sophisticated
treatments to determine whether this variable contributes to the shrinkage of
government. And the studies, on the whole, by political scientists of all po-
litical stripes, have found either no effect or a small effect at the state level.2
There is, I think, virtually no persuasive evidence that the line-item
veto reduces the size of government. The main effect the political scientists
have found is that the line-item veto, which gives more power to the gover-
nor, energizes the governor's bargaining power, which might be used for
bigger or smaller government.3 It benefits the constituencies of the gover-
nor in a way that is unpredictable as to its ultimate effect. So, at least based
upon these studies and the unimpressive performance in the Clinton Ad-
ministration, I would not be optimistic about the ability of the line-item veto
to shrink government.
On term limits, we do not have sufficient empirical data. We certainly
do not have experience at the federal level, except with voluntary term limi-
tations. In my opinion, term limits are not likely to head off the main dys-
functions I would be concerned about. Because term limits do not apply to
agencies, they do not address the problem of turf-protection by agencies.
Nor will term-limiting your representatives address the logrolling problem;
logs get rolled, compromises get made as part of the normal process of leg-
islation. Finally, I doubt that term limits solve the special interest problem.
Even recently elected representatives, such as the Democrats who have
been elected in substantial numbers to the new Congress, did not waltz into
Capitol Hill as naYve lambs. They marched in stoked to the gills with spe-
cial interest money and influence. Don't laugh, because the Republicans
did the same in 1995. This cuts both ways. So, at least as a theoretical mat-
ter, I am not all that optimistic even about term limits.
As to the initiative or the referendum, we have a lot of experience at
the municipal and the state level since the early part of the twentieth cen-
tury. To be sure, most academics are hostile to this proposal. But few of
them have examined the evidence systematically. University of Southern
California Professor John Matsusaka, however, has systematically studied
this lawmaking mechanism in his excellent book, For the Many or the
2 See, e.g., Douglas Holtz-Eakin, The Line Item Veto and Public Sector Budgets: Evidence from the
States 1-2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2531, 1988) (discussing that the line-
item veto has minimal effects on states' long run budgets); see also Catherine C. Reese, The Line-Item
Veto in Practice in Ten Southern States, 57 PuB. ADMIN. REV. 510, 515 (1997) (concluding that the
line-item veto has not been useful for controlling general expenditures at the state level).
3 See, e.g., Holtz-Eakin, supra note 2, at 1-2.
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Few.4 Based upon a sophisticated empirical analysis that controls for the
most obvious variables, Matsusaka found that, for the period from 1970 to
2000, states with the initiative had substantially lower taxes, substantially
lower spending, and substantially greater localization of government than
states without the initiative.'
Professor Matsusaka also found that the initiative in the early twentieth
century actually helped increase the size of government because urban in-
terests in the early twentieth century were underrepresented in legislatures.6
They wanted more government. And so, the initiative actually fueled their
desire for more and larger government. According to Matsusaka, as a theo-
retical matter, initiatives do not inherently produce government in the direc-
tion of less or more government; they produce government in the direction
of electoral preferences.7 Now, that might be good from the limited gov-
ernment perspective, if you think that the preferences of the electorate will
remain in favor of limited government. I do not exactly know what the
preferences are today or what they will be tomorrow; so, it is quite possible.
Now, if you think that the national government is too big because of
special interest logrolls and turf-grabbing, and not because it represents
popular preferences, then you might want to consider the national initiative
as your device for constitutional change. I do not think you would ever get
this through the constitutional amendment process, but that is another mat-
ter.
Nor am I certain that the national initiative would ultimately diminish
the size of government at the national level. There might be some worka-
bility problems. Moreover, some political scientists, such as Harvard's Paul
Peterson, argue that issues of redistribution-which are often rent-seeking
issues-in a federalist political system such as ours naturally gravitate to-
ward the national level and away from the local and state levels where peo-
ple can vote with their feet.8 If that is the case, if Peterson's hypothesis is
correct, you might see the national initiative subjected to the same kind of
rent-seeking and logrolling you have already seen. Moreover, you might
think-and this is interesting-that the U.S. Senate, which disproportion-
ately represents the small-population states of the sagebrush West, might be
a brake on big government, and that that brake might actually be diminished
with the national initiative, because the larger population states such as
California would play a larger role.
4 JOHN G. MATSUSAKA, FOR THE MANY OR THE FEW: THE INITIATIVE, PUBLIC POLICY, AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2004).
5 Id. at 33, 47.
6 Id. at 94-97.
7Id.
8 Michael J. Rich, Book Review, 58 J. POL. 1226 (1996) (reviewing PAUL PETERSON, THE PRICE OF
FEDERALISM).
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Among the constitutional proposals the convenors asked us to evaluate,
I believe the initiative is the most promising constitutional mechanism for
reducing the size of government, but I am far from certain that it would
have that effect in the long term.
Going beyond the list suggested by the convenors, one might also con-
sider an individual rights-based constitutional strategy for reducing the size
of government. Depending on where you are coming from, you might want
to redo the Fourth Amendment, the home of a privacy right that includes
protections not only of the body but of the home.' That might shrink gov-
ernment in some ways.
Probably the most promising individual-rights strategy would be to re-
invigorate the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause. This provision is almost
never enforced by the U.S. Supreme Court. ° An anti-big government re-
form should refocus the Fifth Amendment to regulate what we call regula-
tory takings, one way in which national, state, and local governments often
grow at the expense of small businesses. (Do not ask me to suggest the
language for such an amendment!) Whatever amendment you come up
with, you can bet your copy of the Constitution that you attorneys would
litigate the hell out of it. Litigation over the meaning of a more expansive
Takings Clause actually might discourage aggressive government regula-
tion in several arenas. Government would be scared off by the prospect of
litigation, and not just by the actual constitutional language.
There are many problems with revising the Takings Clause, such as
coming up with appropriate language and pushing the proposal through the
exceedingly difficult Article V process. A deeper problem with a broader
Takings Clause is that it might disable government from doing the things
that we need the government to do.
9 U.S. CONST. amend. IV (stating that people have the "right . . . to be secure in their persons,
houses.., against unreasonable searches and seizures .... ").
1o See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 485 (1987) (holding
that legislation requiring coal companies to leave coal in place where mining would cause subsidence of
surface did not effect a taking).
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